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Abstract 
 
 The aim of the present study was to compare the accuracy of the Test of 
Memory Malingering (TOMM) with that of the Structured Inventory of the 
Malingered Symptomatology (SIMS) in detecting feigning of cognitive dysfunction in 
participants who received different types of coaching. Ninety undergraduate students 
were administered the TOMM and the SIMS and asked to respond honestly (controls; 
n = 30), or instructed to feign cognitive dysfunction due to head injury (n = 2x30). 
Before both instruments were administered, symptom-coached feigners (n = 30) were 
provided with some information about brain injury, while feigners who received a mix 
of symptom-coaching and test-coaching (n = 30) were given the same information 
plus advice on how to defeat symptom validity tests. When used separately, the 
subtests of the TOMM correctly classified 87-97 percent of the symptom-coached 
feigners and 80 percent of the feigners who received symptom-coaching plus test-
coaching. When these subtests were used in combination, the TOMM correctly 
identified 97 percent of the symptom-coached feigners and 87 percent of the 
symptom/test-coached feigners. The SIMS correctly classified 93 percent of the 
symptom-coached feigners and 86 percent of the symptom/test-coached feigners. 
None of the honest responders were misclassified as feigners by either the TOMM or 
the SIMS. Our findings suggest that both the TOMM and the SIMS are relatively 
resistant to the effects of coaching. 
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Introduction 
 Evidence suggests that a nontrivial percentage of neuropsychological patients 
seeking financial compensation for cognitive dysfunction perform below their actual 
cognitive capabilities and/or engage in overreporting of symptoms (Mittenberg, 
Patton, Canyock, & Condit, 2002; Sharland & Gfeller, 2007). Different strategies 
have been proposed to investigate symptom validity in medicolegal cases. Some 
authors opine that a negative response basis can be detected by looking at inconsistent 
test performance on standard neuropsychological tests (Hartlage, 1998). For example, 
attention and concentration mediate memory performance. If a patient performs well 
on memory tests, but poorly on tests of attention and concentration, this would be a 
possible indication of underperformance on some of the tests. Research, however, has 
shown that clinicians have great difficulty in detecting negative response bias. In a 
number of experiments, experienced clinical neuropsychologists were given 
neuropsychological test protocols from several individuals (Faust, Hart, & Guilmette, 
1988; Heaton, Smith, Lehman, & Vogt, 1978). Some protocols were from healthy 
participants who were instructed to feign cognitive dysfunction, while others were 
from patients with genuine brain injury. The clinicians were asked to judge which 
protocols were indicative of feigning. Although the neuropsychologists were fully 
informed about the purpose of the experiments, they often were unable to distinguish 
instructed feigners from genuine patients. 
 The finding that clinicians have difficulty in detecting negative response bias 
has inspired researchers to develop special symptom validity tests. These tests are 
usually based on the notion that people engaged in exaggeration and feigning have 
limited knowledge of true neurological and psychopathological symptoms (Larrabee, 
2007). Broadly speaking, there are two types of symptom validity tests (Iverson, 
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2006). The first category consists of cognitive tests designed to measure 
underperformance or poor effort. These tests usually involve an easy memory task 
requiring only passive recognition. Feigners do not know that most genuine brain-
injured patients do quite well on simple recognition tasks. Because they want to 
convince the examiner that they suffer from brain damage, feigners will perform more 
poorly than true patients. One of the most widely used and best studied performance 
tests designed to detect cognitive underperformance is the Test of Memory 
Malingering (TOMM; Tombaugh, 1996). The second category of symptom validity 
tests are self-report instruments that measure overendorsement of symptoms. These 
tests present patients with items that refer to atypical and bizarre symptoms that – in 
the eyes of laypeople – seem to be related to a particular syndrome or condition (such 
as brain damage). Because feigners want to appear suffering from a syndrome or 
condition, they will endorse substantially more of these atypical and bizarre items 
than genuine patients. A widely used self-report tool developed to measure 
overendorsement of symptoms is the Structured Inventory of the Malingered 
Symptomatology (SIMS; Smith & Burger, 1997). 
 There is reason to believe that attorneys sometimes educate their clients about 
how to feign symptoms of brain injury prior to a neuropsychological evaluation 
(Youngjohn, 1995; see also Rosen, 1995). Such “attorney coaching” may undermine 
the accuracy of symptom validity tests like the TOMM and the SIMS. Therefore, 
Youngjohn, Lees-Haley, and Binder (1999) argued that providing feigners with 
information about true patients and warning them not to exaggerate symptoms could 
lead to sophisticated feigning behavior. Meanwhile, systematic research on the effect 
of coaching on the accuracy of symptom validity tests is largely lacking (Blaskewitz 
& Merten, 2007; Gorny & Merten, 2005; Suhr & Gunstad, 2007). What is known, 
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though, is that when coaching is brief and only involves a superficial introduction to 
the to-be-feigned symptoms, its undermining effects on the ability of symptom 
validity tests to detect feigning are limited (e.g., Rose, Hall, Szalda-Petree & Bach, 
1998). On the other hand, one can also find examples in the literature where more 
extensive forms of coaching did lead to considerable drops in the efficacy of symptom 
validity tests to detect feigned disorders (e.g., Gunstad & Suhr, 2001). According to 
Powell, Gfeller, Hendricks, & Sharland (2004) there are two types of coaching. 
Firstly, potential feigners can be educated about the symptoms of the to-be-feigned 
disorder. This type of coaching has been labelled “symptom-coaching”. Secondly, 
they can also be provided with information on how to defeat symptom validity tests. 
This latter type of coaching has been termed “test-coaching”. 
The present study was initiated to study the effects of different kinds of 
coaching on the accuracy of two widely used symptom validity tests, the TOMM and 
the SIMS, used to investigate negative response bias. Although there are hints in the 
literature that both the TOMM (see Powell et al., 2004) and the SIMS (see Jelicic, 
Hessels, & Merckelbach, 2006; Jelicic, Merckelbach, Candel, & Geraerts, 2007) are 
relatively immune to a moderate degree of coaching (symptom-coaching), we 
hypothesized that more extensive coaching (symptom-coaching plus test-coaching) 
would undermine the diagnostic accuracy of both instruments. 
 
Methods 
Participants 
 There were 90 participants (20 men) who volunteered to take part in a 
simulation experiment. They were undergraduate students, alumni, or employees of 
Maastricht University. Some of the students received course credit, while others 
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participated in the experiment in return for a small financial compensation 
(approximately 8 US$). The experiment was approved by the standing ethical 
committee of the Faculty of Psychology and Neuroscience of Maastricht University. 
Mean age was 22 years (SD = 4.7; range 17-49 years). Participants with a history of 
neurological or psychiatric disorders were excluded from the study. None of the 
participants had any knowledge of psychological or psychiatric methods. They were 
randomly assigned to one of the three groups. 
Materials 
 Participants were administered the TOMM and the SIMS. The TOMM 
(Tombaugh, 1996) contains two learning trials where the participant is presented with 
50 line drawings of common objects, followed by a forced choice recognition task. 
Feedback is given after each item. A Retention Trial, given 20 minutes after the last 
learning trial, consists of the forced choice task only. A score of less than 45 on the 
second learning trial (Trial 2) or the Retention Trial is considered indicative of 
underperformance. The SIMS (Smith & Burger, 1997) is a self-report measure 
designed to screen for feigning in five domains: low intelligence, affective disorders, 
neurological impairment, psychosis, and amnesia. It consists of 75 yes-no items that 
refer to bizarre and atypical symptoms and complaints. Total SIMS scores range from 
0 to 75. Scores exceeding the cut-off of 16 are regarded to be indicative of 
overreporting. The Dutch version of the SIMS (Merckelbach & Smith, 2003) was 
used in the present study. 
Procedure 
 Because the experimenter had to remain “blind” for the assignment of the 
participants to the three conditions, participants were given a blank envelope 
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containing the instructions. To ensure random distribution of the three types of 
instructions, the envelopes were shuffled before the data collection started (i.e., before 
the first participant took part in the study). Participants were requested not to disclose 
the instructions to the experimenter before the end of the test session. In the control 
group (n = 30), participants were asked to do their best on the tests and to fill out the 
questionnaire honestly. In the symptom-coached feigning group (n = 30), participants 
were given a scenario about an accident in which they sustained head injury, and they 
were asked to act as though they had deficits resulting from that accident. These 
participants were specifically instructed to feign or exaggerate symptoms of brain 
injury in a believable way. They were also provided with information about cognitive 
dysfunction after head injury, and were warned that at least one of the tests they 
would receive was designed to catch them feigning. The scenario and instructions for 
the symptom-coached group were taken from Suhr and Gunstad (2000). In the 
feigning group who received a mix of symptom-coaching and test-coaching (n = 30), 
participants received the same scenario and the same information about cognitive 
dysfunction after head injury. Like in the group that underwent symptom-coaching, 
they received a list of symptoms and were told that at least one of the tests they would 
receive was designed to catch them feigning. However, they also received the 
following instruction: Note that, instruments developed to identify faking of cognitive 
problems look just like normal tests and questionnaires. However, on these 
instruments patients with brain damage and healthy people who are not engaged in 
faking cognitive problems obtain similar scores. Therefore, try to score normally on 
instruments that could be designed to catch you faking! The participants in the three 
groups first completed the first two trials of the TOMM. They then had to fill out the 
SIMS. Finally, they were given the Retention Trial of the TOMM. 
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 Results 
 Unfortunately, four participants (one in the control group, one in the symptom-
coached feigning group, and two in the feigning group that underwent symptom-
coaching plus test-coaching) had skipped a number of questions on the SIMS. They 
were therefore excluded from the analyses of the SIMS scores. 
Mean total TOMM and SIMS scores of the three groups are presented in Table 
1. One-way Analysis of Variance (ANOVA) showed significant differences between 
the three groups with regard to scores on Trial 2 of the TOMM [F (2, 87) = 48.8; p < 
.05]. Post-hoc analyses using Student-Newman-Keuls (SNK) tests demonstrated that 
participants in the control group had higher scores on this subtest of the TOMM than 
those in the two feigning groups (both p’s < .05), while there was no reliable 
difference in Trial 2 scores between the two feigning groups. An ANOVA also 
showed significant differences between the three groups with respect to scores on the 
Retention Trial of the TOMM [F (2, 87) = 52.6; p < .05]. Post-hoc comparisons using 
SNK tests showed that participants in the control group again had higher scores on 
this subtest of the TOMM than those in the two feigning groups (both p’s < .05). In 
addition, the two feigning groups did not differ in their scores on the Retention Trial 
of the TOMM. An ANOVA also indicated significant differences in SIMS scores 
between the three groups [F (2, 83) = 93.7; p < .05]. Post-hoc analyses using SNK 
tests showed that participants in the control group had lower SIMS scores than those 
in the two feigning groups (both p’s < .05). There was no reliable difference between 
the two feigning groups with regard to the SIMS scores. 
 
Table 1 about here 
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  Table 2 shows the number (and percentage) of participants in each group that 
were correctly classified as honest responders or feigners on the basis of the TOMM 
or SIMS cut-offs. All the control participants were correctly classified as honest 
responders (specificity). Moreover, 87 percent of the symptom-coached participants 
and 80 percent of the symptom/test-coached participants were correctly identified as 
feigners by Trial 2 of the TOMM, while 97 percent of the symptom-coached 
participants and 80 percent of the symptom/test-coached participants were correctly 
classified by the Retention Trial of the TOMM (sensitivity).The difference in 
detection rate between feigners who received symptom-coaching only and those who 
underwent symptom-coaching and test-coaching was significant for the Retention 
Trial [χ2 (1) = 4.04, p < .05], but not for Trial 2. Note that there were participants who 
had a score above the cut-off on Trail 2 of the TOMM and below the cutting point on 
the Retention trial, and vice versa. Only one participant in the symptom-coached 
feigning group and four participants in the symptom/test-coached feigning group had 
scores above the cut-off on both subtests of the TOMM. When participants with at 
least one score below the cutting point are labelled as feigners, 97 percent of the 
symptom-coached feigners and 87 percent of the symptom/test-coached feigners were 
correctly identified. As for the SIMS, 93 percent of the symptom-coached participants 
and 86 percent of the symptom/test-coached participants were correctly classified as 
feigners. The difference in detection rates between feigners who received symptom-
coaching only and those who underwent symptom-coaching plus test-coaching failed 
to reach significance. 
 
Table 2 about here 
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 Discussion 
 The results of our study can be summarized as follows. Neither the TOMM 
nor the SIMS yielded any false positives. That is, on both tests there were no control 
participants who were misclassified. When using only Trial 2 or the Retention Trial of 
the TOMM, 87-97 percent of the symptom-coached participants and 80 percent of the 
symptom/test-coached participants were correctly classified as feigners. When both 
subtests of the TOMM were used in combination, 97 percent of the symptom-coached 
participants and 87 percent of the symptom/test-coached participants were correctly 
identified as feigners. The SIMS correctly classified 93 percent of the symptom-
coached participants and 86 percent of the symptom/test-coached participants as 
feigners. Although the accuracy of the TOMM and SIMS appears to be somewhat 
reduced by a mix of symptom-coaching and test-coaching, even feigners who 
underwent this type of coaching were most of the times defeated by the symptom 
validity tests. Thus, it seems that both the TOMM and the SIMS are relatively 
resistant to the effects of coaching. 
 Some authors (e.g., Iverson, 2006) propose that multiple symptom validity 
tests should be used in forensic neuropsychological assessments. This notion is 
supported by the results of the present study. In our study, there were only two 
instructed feigners (both from the group that received a mix of symptom-coaching and 
test-coaching) who were able to score normally on all three symptom validity 
measures. 
The present findings are well in line with previous studies. Powell et al. (2004) 
studied the effect of symptom-coaching and test-coaching on the ability of the TOMM 
to detect feigned cognitive dysfunction. Participants were asked to feign and received 
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either symptom-coaching or test-coaching. Powell and colleagues found that 93 
percent of the symptom-coached and 96 percent of the test-coached participants were 
correctly classified as feigners. Jelicic et al. (2007) examined the effect of symptom-
coaching on the efficacy of the SIMS to detect feigning of cognitive dysfunction and 
found that 90 percent of the coached participants were correctly identified as feigners. 
 A few potential limitations of the current study warrant comment. Most of our 
participants were women. Although there is no a priori reason to assume that coaching 
leads to more sophisticated feigning behavior in men relative to women, the 
overrepresentation of female participants may have influenced our results. A more 
serious limitation pertains to the use of instructed feigners. In our study, as well as in 
many other studies, normal participants were instructed to feign cognitive 
dysfunction. Some authors argue that real life feigners have a greater motivation to 
feign in a sophisticated way than research participants who are instructed to feign 
cognitive dysfunction (Rogers, 2008). Although one could argue that our findings 
may have limited external validity, there is evidence that students can mimic 
neuropsychological test scores of brain injured patients in quite a believable way 
(Haines & Norris, 2001). Also, if symptom validity tests such as the TOMM and the 
SIMS appear to be relatively insensitive to coached feigning attempts of college 
students, their robustness might even be better in a forensic or clinical setting who 
often have lower levels of education.  
There are hints in the literature that bona fide patients, especially those with 
severe cognitive dysfunction, do not always pass symptom validity tests (Teichner & 
Wagner, 2004). Because all our controls were normal participants who were asked to 
respond honestly, the absence of false positives in our study may be somewhat 
unrealistic. To get a more realistic idea of specificity rates in medicolegal and clinical 
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settings, future research on the efficacy of the TOMM and the SIMS should use an 
additional control group consisting of patients with documented brain injury. 
Finally, one could argue that our test-coaching was somewhat superficial. We 
educated participants undergoing this type of coaching about the basic idea behind 
symptom validity tests. They were not provided with detailed information about the 
TOMM and the SIMS. In future studies, it would be interesting to investigate the 
robustness of the TOMM and SIMS using more thorough forms of test-coaching.  
 Notwithstanding the above limitations, it seems that both the TOMM and the 
SIMS are relatively robust to a combination of symptom-coaching and test-coaching. 
Thus, both instruments may be used in the assessment of cognitive dysfunction in 
medicolegal cases. 
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Table 1. 
 
Mean Scores (SD) on the Test of Memory Malingering (TOMM) and Structured 
Inventory of Malingered Symptomatology (SIMS) of Participants in the Three Groups  
 
 Control 
Participants 
(TOMM n = 30; 
SIMS n = 29) 
Symptom-
Coached 
Malingerers 
(TOMM n = 30; 
SIMS n = 29) 
Symptom/Test-
Coached 
Malingerers 
(TOMM n = 30; 
SIMS n = 28) 
 
TOMM Trial 2 
 
 
50.0 (0.2) 
 
34.8 (8.0) 
 
38.0 (7.4) 
 
TOMM 
Retention Trial  
 
 
50.0 (0) 
 
32.1 (7.9) 
 
36.3 (9.3) 
 
SIMS 
 
 
4.6 (2.7) 
 
25.8 (6.8) 
 
27.2 (9.8) 
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Table 2. 
Number (and Percentage) of Participants in the Three Groups Correctly Classified by 
the Test of Memory Malingering (TOMM) and the Structured Inventory of the 
Malingered Symptomatology (SIMS) in the Three Groups  
 
 Control 
Participants 
(TOMM n = 30; 
SIMS n = 29) 
Symptom-
Coached 
Malingerers 
(TOMM n = 30; 
SIMS n = 29) 
Symptom/Test-
Coached 
Malingerers 
(TOMM n = 30; 
SIMS n = 28) 
 
TOMM Trial 2 
 
 
30 (100%) 
 
26 (87%) 
 
24 (80%) 
 
TOMM 
Retention Trial  
 
 
30 (100%) 
 
29 (97%) 
 
24 (80%) 
 
TOMM Trial 2 
and Retention 
Trial combined 
 
30 (100%) 
 
29 (97%) 
 
26 (87%) 
 
SIMS 
 
 
29 (100%) 
 
27 (93%) 
 
24 (86%) 
The two TOMM 
trials and SIMS 
combined 
 
29 (100%) 
 
29 (100%) 
 
26 (93%) 
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